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CONTINUING THE HISTORICAL TREND
TOWARDS INCREASED SCRUTINY OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
John P. Bringewatt*
In March 2008, the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. Louisiana, the
latest in the line of progeny of Batson v. Kentucky. This Note dem-
onstrates that Snyder is part of a historical pattern of Supreme
Court decisions concerning the use of peremptory challenges in
which the Court has moved away from permitting the unfettered use
of the peremptory challenge in favor of stronger Equal Protection
considerations. Snyder alters the requirements for trial judges in
deciding Batson challenges by requiring them to provide some ex-
planation of their reasons for accepting a prosecutor's justification
of a peremptory challenge. Snyder is the latest step in the historical
pattern of trying to create a more enforceable standard to prevent
racial discrimination injury selection and in keeping with this pat-
tern should be broadly interpreted going forward.
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INTRODUCTION
The peremptory challenge is a longstanding jury selection tool that al-
lows parties to remove prospective jurors without cause.' The challenge has
traditionally been thought of as a way to ensure an impartial jury by allow-
ing parties to dismiss any prospective juror they suspect might be biased
against them.' In contrast to a challenge for cause, which requires showing a
specific reason why a juror might not be impartial, no justification is re-
quired for a peremptory challenge.3 Historically, "[t]he essential nature of
the peremptory challenge [was] that it [was] one exercised without a reason
stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control. 4
"The peremptory challenge has very old credentials," coming to the
United States by way of English common law.5 Emphasizing the purely dis-
cretionary nature of the peremptory challenge, Blackstone described it as
"an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge."6 Blackstone nonetheless
justified the challenge in terms of fairness and "tenderness and humanity" to
defendants, asserting that a defendant should not have to be tried by anyone
whom he suspects might be prejudiced against him.' Blackstone wrote that
the peremptory challenge could only be exercised by defendants, not by the
Crown,8 but ultimately "[pleremptories on both sides became the settled law
of England."9
The traditional unfettered, purely discretionary use of the peremptory
challenge allowed attorneys to remove a prospective juror on the basis of
race.'° An inherent and well-recognized tension therefore exists between this
traditional operation of the peremptory challenge and the protections af-
1. E.g., Brian W. Stoltz, Note, Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers En-
force the Principles of Batson, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1031 (2007).
2. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
3. E.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Tri-
als: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 11-12 (2001).
4. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
5. Id. at212-14.
6. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *353-54.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *353.
9. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213. The Criminal Justice Act of 1988, however, abolished the per-
emptory challenge in England. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/ukpga_19880033_en_ 13.
10. E.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
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forded by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Those who defend the longstanding power of attorneys to dismiss prospec-
tive jurors without any required justification argue that "[a]nalytically, there
is no middle ground: [a] challenge either has to be explained or it does
not."' 2 In response, those favoring stronger Equal Protection principles for
jury selection argue that the Fourteenth Amendment trumps the historical
role of the peremptory challenge, which is not constitutionally compelled. 3
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held for the first time that it
was unconstitutional to use peremptory challenges to dismiss individual
prospective jurors on the basis of race. 4 The Batson Court focused on the
danger posed in criminal cases by a prosecutor using peremptory challenges
in a racially discriminatory manner, which denies a defendant'5 an important
aspect of his right to a jury trial and violates the Equal Protection Clause.'
6
The Batson Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prose-
cutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race."'17 Batson
created a process for defendants to challenge a prosecutor's use of peremp-
tory challenges."
Concurring in Batson, Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed his view
that the danger posed by racially discriminatory use of the peremptory chal-
lenge justified the elimination of the challenge.' Nearly twenty years later,
Justice Breyer noted the continued prevalence of racially motivated peremp-
tory challenges and echoed Justice Marshall's call for the abolition of the
challenge.2 0 Despite Batson's requirement of racial neutrality, studies
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
12. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 127 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
14. 476 U.S. at 96-98. Prior to Batson, a defendant was required to show a pattern of racially
discriminatory usage of peremptory challenges across cases in order to establish an Equal Protection
violation. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.
15. Prospective jurors excluded from jury service by racially discriminatory practices also
may challenge jury selection procedures under the Equal Protection Clause. Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970). A defendant may also assert the Equal Protection rights of excluded ju-
rors. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). This Note, however, focuses exclusively on the
rights of criminal defendants to challenge the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges on their
own behalf.
16. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. The Court eventually held that it was unconstitutional for any
party to make peremptory challenges on the basis of race. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42
(1992) (holding that it is unconstitutional for criminal defendants to make peremptory challenges on
the basis of race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that it is
unconstitutional for civil litigants to make peremptory challenges on the basis of race).
17. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
18. Id. at 93-94. See infra text accompanying notes 53-57 for an explanation of the Batson
standard.
19. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
20. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El 11), 545 U.S. 231, 266-73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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21suggest that peremptory strikes are routinely made on the basis of race.
Contrary to the general societal goal of removing racial discrimination from
the administration of our criminal justice system, some trial lawyers view
the use of racial stereotypes in jury selection as a legitimate litigation strat-22
egy. Because of such views, "rac[ial] ... discrimination [in jury selection]
continue[s] to flourish with corrective judicial action likely in only the most
extreme circumstances. 23
In March 2008, the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. Louisiana , the
latest in the line of Batson progeny. Snyder is the Court's most recent at-
tempt to address the tension between the peremptory challenge and the
Equal Protection Clause and to control the danger posed to a defendant's
rights by the racially motivated use of peremptory challenges. At first
glance, the Snyder opinion is unremarkable. The majority opinion is short-
about seven pages long-and does not explicitly claim to create a new legal
standard for Batson challenges. However, as the Snyder dissent points out,
Snyder does in fact impose a standard for Batson challenges that had not
existed before.
This Note argues that Snyder is part of a historical pattern of Supreme
Court decisions concerning the use of peremptory challenges in which the
Court has increasingly applied a more individualized focus in an effort to
create a more enforceable standard, moving away from the unfettered use of
the peremptory challenge to more heavily weigh Equal Protection consid-
erations. Part I provides the historical context necessary to understand the
Snyder decision, discussing the line of Supreme Court cases dealing with
racial discrimination in jury selection leading up to Snyder, including Bat-
son, its predecessors, and its progeny. Part I demonstrates that over time the
Supreme Court has applied increasingly detailed scrutiny in its analysis of
such cases in an attempt to make Equal Protection principles more enforce-
able. Part II discusses the background of Snyder and argues that it alters the
requirements for trial courts in deciding Batson challenges by requiring
them to more carefully scrutinize the justifications proffered in support of
peremptory challenges made by prosecutors. Part III shows that Snyder is
the latest step in the historical pattern of trying to create a more enforceable
standard to prevent racial discrimination in jury selection and argues for a
broad interpretation of Snyder going forward.
21. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 10 (finding that racially motivated peremptory
challenges were commonly used in capital trials in Philadelphia); Gregory E. Mize, Editorial, A
Legal Discrimination; Juries aren't supposed to be picked on the basis of race and sex, but it hap-
pens all the time, WASH. PosT, Oct. 8, 2000, at B8 (the author is a former D.C. Superior Court
Judge).
22. See Baldus et al., supra note 3, at 127.
23. Id. at 128.
24. 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).
25. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1213 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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I. THE BATSON LINE OF CASES: A PATTERN OF
INCREASING SCRUTINY
Snyder is the latest in a line of cases in which the Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of racially discriminatory jury selection procedures. The
problem is not a new one; the Court first addressed it in 1880.26 The persis-
tence of the issue over time suggests that it has been difficult to find a
lasting solution to the problem.
This Part discusses the line of Supreme Court cases addressing the ap-
plication of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection principles to racial
discrimination in jury selection and suggests a pattern in the Court's deci-
sions. Section L.A offers a historical analysis of the line of cases leading up
to Snyder, beginning with Batson's predecessors, including Strauder v. West
28Virginia" and Swain v. Alabama, and continuing up to recent Batson prog-
eny. Section L.A also traces the Court's discussion of the tension between
Equal Protection principles and the sanctity of the traditional peremptory
challenge. Section I.B argues that this line of cases presents a pattern in
which the Supreme Court has, over time, applied a more individualized fo-
cus in its analyses of racial discrimination in jury selection in an effort to
create a more enforceable Equal Protection standard.
A. Batson, its Predecessors, and its Progeny
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of Equal Protection in the
29context of jury selection in Strauder v. West Virginia. In Strauder, the ap-
pellant, a black man who had been convicted of murder, argued that his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated by a West Vir-
ginia law that prevented anyone besides white men from serving on a jury.3°
The Court framed the issue as follows:
[T]he ... question[] is not whether a colored man, when an indictment has
been preferred against him, has a right to a grand or a petit jury composed
in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color, but it is whether, in
the composition or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or
tried, all persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely be-
cause of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man
sit upon the jury."
26. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
27. Id.
28. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
29. 100 U.S. 303.
30. Id. at 304-05.
31. Id. at 305.
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The principles underlying this statement of the issue continue to be em-• • •32
braced in the Court's modem Equal Protection jurisprudence. The Strauder
Court noted the importance of the right of a defendant to be tried by a jury
"composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected
.. to determine" and that "the constitution of juries is a very essential part
of the protection such a mode of trial is intended to secure., 3  The Court
concluded that a law excluding black citizens from jury service violated a
black defendant's rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
3
4
Strauder established the basic principle that categorical racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection35 by law is unconstitutional. This restriction did not,
however, end the practice of racial discrimination in jury selection.
In Swain v. Alabama, decided by the Supreme Court in 1965, the Court
first considered whether racially based peremptory challenges could violate
the Equal Protection Clause.37 Robert Swain was convicted of rape in the
Circuit Court of Talladega County and sentenced to death." Although there
was no statutory prohibition, the Court recognized that "no [African-
American] ha[d] actually served on a petit jury [in Talladega County] since
about 1950."'9 Swain challenged his conviction on the grounds that the jury
selection process violated the Equal Protection Clause. 40 At Swain's trial,
there were eight black venirepersons. 4' None of them ultimately served on
the jury. Six of the eight were excluded because the prosecutor used per-
42emptory challenges to remove them. In evaluating the Equal Protection
claim, the Court concluded that "the defendant must, to pose the issue, show
the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against [African-
32. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) ("In holding that racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Strauder recognized,
however, that a defendant has no right to a 'petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his
own race.'... But the defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are se-
lected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.") (citations omitted) (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at
305).
33. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
34. Id. at 309-10.
35. Strauder's holding was framed in terms of discrimination in the selection of both grand
and petit juries. See id. at 308 ("That the West Virginia statute respecting juries-the statute that
controlled the selection of the grand and petit jury in the case of the plaintiff in error-is such a
discrimination ought not to be doubted."). This Note addresses Equal Protection issues related to the
selection of petit juries. Defendants also have a constitutional right to a grand jury selected in a
racially non-discriminatory way. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986).
36. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309-10.
37. 380 U.S. 202, 210-28 (1965).
38. Id. at 203.
39. Id. at 205.
40. Id. at 203-04.
41. Id. at 205. A venire is "a panel of persons selected for jury duty and from among whom
the jurors are to be chosen." BLACK'S LAW DIc-rIONARY 1694 (9th ed. 2009).
42. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
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Americans] over a period of time., 43 The Court thus created a burdensome
standard in which defendants were required to demonstrate-apparently by
questioning the relevant prosecutors-that prosecutors had discriminated in
jury selection across numerous cases."4 The difficulty criminal defendants
face under this standard is demonstrated by the Court's decision in Swain:
despite the fact that there had been no black jurors in Talladega County in
fifteen years, the Court did not find an Equal Protection violation and af-
45firmed the conviction.
The Swain Court addressed the interaction between the peremptory chal-
lenge and the application of Equal Protection principles to jury selection,
though it was unwilling to dive into the question of whether the prosecutors
in Swain were racially motivated in making peremptory challenges. The
majority opinion deferred to the tradition of the peremptory challenge as a
purely discretionary device. The Court stated:
To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands
and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a rad-
ical change in the nature and operation of the challenge. The challenge, pro
tanto, would no longer be peremptory, each and every challenge being
open to examination, either at the time of the challenge or at a hearing af-
terwards. The prosecutor's judgment underlying each challenge would be
subject to scrutiny for reasonableness and sincerity. And a great many uses
of the challenge would be banned.46
In his dissent, however, Justice Goldberg (joined by Chief Justice War-
ren and Justice Douglas) recognized the tension between the peremptory
challenge and the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Goldberg concluded that
"[w]ere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a de-
fendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Consti-
tution compels a choice of the former. 47 This tension continues to play an
important role in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on this issue as the
Court attempts to balance the competing principles.
The framework of the modem standard for applying Equal Protection
principles to jury selection was established in 1986 in Batson v. Kentucky.48
The petitioner in Batson, a black man, challenged the jury selection process
at his burglary trial after the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to re-
move all four black venirepersons. 49 The Supreme Court recognized that the
case called for them to reconsider Swain, ° acknowledging that "Swain has
43. Id. at 227.
44. See id. at 227-28.
45. Id. at 228.
46. Id. at 221-22.
47. Id. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
48. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
49. Id. at 83.
50. Id. at 82.
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placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof."5' As the Court explained
in a subsequent decision:
Swain's demand to make out a continuity of discrimination over time,
however, turned out to be difficult to the point of unworkable, and in Bat-
son v. Kentucky, we recognized that this requirement to show an extended
pattern imposed a crippling burden of proof that left prosecutors' use of
peremptories largely immune from constitutional scrutiny. 2
The Court recognized the need to undertake a more thorough examina-
tion of the use of peremptory challenges if it intended to create an
enforceable Equal Protection standard for jury selection. The Batson Court
thus abolished the standard requiring a defendant to show a pattern of dis-
crimination over multiple cases53 and concluded that "the Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account
of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable
impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant. 54 Batson
created a three-step, burden-shifting process for determining whether a per-
emptory challenge was racially motivated:
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing
has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking
the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties' submissions, the
trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful
discrimination.55
In determining whether the defendant satisfies the prima facie showing
required for a Batson challenge, the Court instructed trial courts to consider
the prosecutor's pattern of striking black venirepersons as well as any
statements made and questions asked by the prosecutor as part of a consid-
eration of "all relevant circumstances.5 6 If the defendant makes the
necessary prima facie showing, the Court noted that "[t]hough this require-
ment imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of
the historic challenge, we emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need
not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. 57 The Court
51. See id. at 92.
52. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El I1), 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
53. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 ("[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial.").
54. Id. at 89.
55. Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El 1), 537 U.S. 322, 328-29 (2003) (citations omitted).
56. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
57. Id. at 97. A challenge for cause is "[a] party's challenge supported by a specified reason,




remanded Batson to the trial court to determine whether the removal of all
the black venirepersons was unconstitutional."
Although the Batson Court recognized some of Swain's failings and at-
tempted to create a more enforceable standard, in the mind of one Justice it
did not do enough to address the threat that peremptory challenges pose to
effective enforcement of Equal Protection principles in jury selection. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Marshall noted that because "[a]ny prosecutor
can assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror," there is a danger that
courts could accept these post hoc rationalizations and "the protection
erected by the Court . . . [would] be illusory."5 9 Justice Marshall concluded
that because of "[t]he inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds ...
the Court [should ideally] ban them entirely from the criminal justice sys-
tem."6
Two cases in the 1990s called into question whether the Court intended
to provide meaningful protections to defendants under Batson. In Hernan-
dez v. New York, the Supreme Court considered a Batson challenge by a
Hispanic defendant who objected to the prosecutor using peremptory chal-S61
lenges against two Hispanic venirepersons. The prosecutor justified the
challenges on the ground that he was uncertain whether the Spanish-
speaking venirepersons could accept the statements of an interpreter as the
definitive representation of what was said by Spanish-speaking witnesses.62
The Court held that "[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the pros-
ecutor's explanation [of a peremptory challenge], the reason offered will be
deemed race neutral." 63 In Purkett v. Elem, the Court rejected a Batson claim
where the prosecutor justified the peremptory challenges of two black veni-
repersons on the grounds that one had long hair and a goatee and the other
also had facial hair.64 The Court held that a prosecutor's race-neutral expla-
nation for a challenge does not have to be "persuasive, or even plausible." 65
In 2005, the Court made a stronger effort to address the continuing
problem of enforcing Equal Protection in jury selection under Batson in
Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El 11).66 In Miller-El II, the Court addressed, for
67the second time, the issue of whether the use of peremptory strikes
58. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.
59. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. 500 U.S. 352, 355-56 (1991).
62. Id. at 356-57.
63. Id. at 360.
64. 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995) (per curiam).
65. Id. at 768.
66. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
67. The Court previously granted certiorari in the case and concluded that Miller-El was




against black venirepersons in Miller-El's capital murder trial constituted a
Batson violation.6' Although Miller-El II did not establish a new standard for
interpreting Batson,69 the Court did recognize and discuss the fundamental
problems inherent in enforcing Batson first recognized by Justice Marshall:
Although the move from Swain to Batson left a defendant free to challenge
the prosecution without having to cast Swain's wide net, the net was not
entirely consigned to history, for Batson's individualized focus came with
a weakness of its own owing to its very emphasis on the particular reasons
a prosecutor might give. If any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a
Batson challenge, then Batson would not amount to much more than
Swain.7°
Beyond simply recognizing this issue, the Miller-El II Court began to
provide a sense of how it thought this enforcement problem could be dealt
with. The Court undertook a detailed analysis of the venirepersons removed
by peremptory challenges, using tools such as side-by-side comparisons of
black venirepersons who were struck from the jury pool with white venire-
persons who were not challenged.7 The Court also undertook an analysis of
"broader patterns of practice during the jury selection."72 The Court con-
ducted a detailed, fact-intensive analysis, providing a model for future
lower-court inquiries.73 The detailed analysis undertaken by the Court ulti-
mately led to the conclusion that "[ilt blinks reality to deny that the State
struck [two of the black venirepersons] ... because they were black."74 The
Court remanded the case with instructions to grant the habeas corpus relief
sought by Miller-El.75
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Miller-El II adopted Justice Mar-
shall's concerns about the difficulties of balancing the continued existence
of the peremptory challenge with an enforceable Equal Protection standard
76for jury selection. Justice Breyer noted the "practical problems of proof'
under Batson, that "despite the strength of [Miller-El's] claim ... [it] re-
sulted in 17 years of largely unsuccessful and protracted litigation. 77 Given
this, Justice Breyer concluded that he "believe[s] it necessary to reconsider
68. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 236-37.
69. Diana L. Garguilo, Recent Decisions, The Batson Standard Remains the Applicable Test
for Stating a Claim of Jury Discrimination Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Miller-El v. Dretke,
44 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 794 (2006) ("Of note is the fact that there is no general issue resolved by the
Supreme Court in the case.").
70. Miller-El 11, 545 U.S. at 239-40.
71. Id. at 240-52.
72. Id. at 253.
73. Heather Davenport, Note, Blinking Reality: Race and Criminal Jury Selection in Light of
Ovalle, Miller-El, and Johnson, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 949, 979 (2006).
74. Miller-El 11, 545 U.S. at 266.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 266-73 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 33s, 342 (2006)
(Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Souter, J.).
77. Miller-El 11, 545 U.S. at 267 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Batson's test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole."78 Justice
Breyer's opinion suggests that the Court was still struggling to create a
workable standard.
B. The Batson Line: Moving Towards a More Enforceable
Equal Protection Standard
The cases discussed in Section L.A demonstrate the difficulty the Court
has had over time in creating an enforceable Equal Protection standard for
jury selection. This Section argues that over the course of time a pattern has
developed in which the Court has moved progressively in the direction of a
more individualized focus in attempting to prevent racial discrimination in
jury selection. Over time, the Court has shifted its focus from discriminatory
statutes, to patterns of cases, to individual cases, to detailed analyses of in-
dividual jurors.
In Strauder, the Court articulated the basic principle that systematically
preventing people from serving as jurors on the basis of their race violates
the Equal Protection Clause.79 The Swain Court applied a slightly more fo-
cused standard, recognizing that Equal Protection principles could be
offended in the absence of a statute explicitly forbidding members of a cer-
tain racial group from serving as jurors, and holding that an Equal
Protection violation exists if a defendant can show that, over a number of
cases, a prosecutor used peremptory challenges on a racially motivated ba-
sis.80 More than twenty years later, the Batson Court finally recognized that
Swain created "a crippling burden of proof' 8' for defendants and for the first
time addressed head-on the tension between peremptory challenges and
Equal Protection principles, holding that an Equal Protection violation can
be established by a prosecutor's use of racially motivated peremptory chal-
lenges in the defendant's case alone.82 Miller-El H recognized the danger
under Batson that prosecutors could offer facially race-neutral justifications
for racially motivated peremptory challenges" and attempted to address this
problem by conducting detailed analyses of the challenges made to individ-
ual prospective jurors as well as by considering broader patterns in jury
selection and in the context of the entire trial.8 Thus, over time, the Court
has applied an increasingly focused analysis in an attempt to root out racial
discrimination in jury selection, moving towards increasingly detailed con-
siderations of the challenges to individual prospective jurors.
78. Id. at 273 (Breyer, J., concurring).
79. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1880).
80. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965).
81. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
82. Id. at 95.
83. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 239-40.
84. Id. at 240-52, 253-64.
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Hernandez and Purkett seem to disrupt this pattern. Both of these cases
weakened the enforcement mechanisms of Batson by allowing prosecutors
to offer "[a]ny facially race-neutral reason, no matter how implausible" in
support of their peremptory challenge to defeat a Batson objection made by
a defendant. 85 However, Miller-El II, decided a decade after Purkett, repre-
sented a clear turn away from these cases. The Miller-El Ii Court recognized
that "[i]f any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson challenge,
then Batson would not amount to much more than Swain. 86 In an implicit
rejection of Purkett, the Court plainly recognized that "[s]ome stated rea-
sons are false."87 Thus, while the Miller-El II majority does not discuss
Purkett, the Court appears to have abolished, or at least called into doubt,
Purkett's low standard for a prosecutor's explanation." Miller-El II placed
the Court back on its long-term trajectory of a more focused Equal Protec-
tion analysis with respect to jury selection.
The increasingly individualized focus of the Supreme Court's analysis
over time has strengthened the application of Equal Protection principles to
jury selection. In placing greater scrutiny on prosecutors' use of peremptory
challenges, the Court seems to have moved towards Justice Goldberg's view
that when the Equal Protection Clause and the peremptory challenge come
into conflict, "the Constitution compels a choice of the former."89 However,
the tension between these concepts remains9o and will continue to be an is-
sue as the Court moves forward. Although Miller-El II recognized many of
the problems inherent to the modem standard for applying Equal Protection
principles to jury selection, it did not create a new legal standard.9' The fun-
damental enforceability problem of Batson-namely, the danger of
prosecutors providing facially race-neutral explanations for racially moti-
vated challenges-thus persists despite Miller-El Irs call for a more
detailed, individualized focus.
II. SNYDER V LOUISIANA: A NEW LEGAL STANDARD
Snyder v. Louisiana9' represents the Supreme Court's latest effort to ad-
dress the problem of creating an enforceable Equal Protection standard to
prevent racial discrimination in jury selection. The Snyder opinion was
handed down in 2008, three years after the Miller-El H Court's extensive
discussion of the problems inherent in enforcing the Batson standard. This
85. Brian W. Wais, Note, Actions Speak Louder than Words: Revisions to the Batson Doc-
trine and Peremptory Challenges in the Wake of Johnson v. California and Miller-El v. Dretke, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 437, 448 (2007).
86. Miller-El H, 545 U.S. at 240.
87. Id.
88. Wais, supra note 85, at 454.
89. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
90. See Miller-El 11, 545 U.S. at 266-73 (Breyer, J., concurring).
91. Garguilo, supra note 69, at 794.
92. 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).
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Part delves deeply into the Snyder decision and the circumstances that led to
the Supreme Court's opinion. Section II.A details the factual background
and procedural history of Snyder. An understanding of this background is
essential to understanding the significance of the Supreme Court's ultimate
decision because the Court limited its focus to one narrow aspect of the
case. Section II.B then undertakes a detailed analysis of the Court's opinion
and argues that Snyder presents a novel standard that imposes new require-
ments on courts for analyzing potential Batson violations.
A. Factual and Procedural Background of Snyder
Allen Snyder was charged with first-degree murder in relation to an Au-
gust 1995 attack in which Snyder repeatedly stabbed his estranged wife and
the man she was dating, wounding his wife and killing her companion.93 An
all-white Louisiana jury convicted Snyder, a black man, and sentenced him
to death based on the sole aggravating factor of knowingly creating a risk of
death or great bodily harm to more than one person.94 Snyder argued that the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors on the basis
of their race in violation of Batson.95
One additional factual detail is essential to understanding the subsequent
development of the case, although it may at first glance appear unrelated to
the issue of peremptory challenges. Prior to trial, the prosecutor in Snyder
made multiple public statements comparing the case to the O.J. Simpson
murder trial. This resulted in a pretrial motion in which the defense counsel
requested a ruling that the prosecutor not be permitted to mention the Simp-
son case at trial. The judge denied the defense attorney's motion when the
prosecutor assured the court that he would not mention the Simpson case to
the jury. Despite this assurance, the prosecutor referenced the Simpson case
in the penalty phase of the trial, stating that "O.J. Simpson 'got away with
it.' "96 Several dissenting justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court thought
that making this argument to an all-white jury demonstrated that the prose-
cutor was attempting to play on racial bias as part of his trial strategy,97
especially given the unpopularity of the Simpson verdict with white citizens
across the country," and thus suggested that the prosecutor's use of peremp-tory challenges was racially motivated.
93. Id. at 1206.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 864 (La. 1999) (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 501 (La. 2006) (Kimball, J., dissent-
ing).
97. See Snyder, 942 So. 2d at 50(-05 (Kimball, J., dissenting); Id. at 506 (Johnson, J., dis-
senting); Snyder, 750 So. 2d at 864 (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at
866-67 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
98. Snyder, 750 So. 2d at 864 (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The Snyder case wove a circuitous path on its way to an eventual deci-
sion on the merits by the U.S. Supreme Court. The murder occurred in 1995
and Snyder was convicted in 1996." The case first reached the Louisiana
Supreme Court in 1999.' °° Among other issues, the court considered whether
a Batson violation had occurred at Snyder's trial, noting that "the prosecutor
used peremptory challenges to strike every African American called as a
prospective juror who survived challenges for cause. ' '
In determining whether a Batson violation occurred, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court cited the low standard for prosecutors' justifications of
peremptory challenges established by Purkett and Hernandez,'°2 but never-
theless looked beyond the Purkett standard and found that "[a]lthough not
required by the caselaw, the State's proffered reasons were plausible, sup-
ported by the record and race-neutral."'0 3 The court also addressed the O.J.
Simpson issue, stating that it was "not firmly convinced that [the comments
about the Simpson case] ... influenced the jury or contributed to the ver-
dict." °4 Two dissenting justices found that a Batson violation had
occurred.'0 5 Both dissenters cited the Simpson reference and the strikes of all
the potential black jurors as evidence of a racially motivated trial strategy by
the prosecution.'t 6 The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Snyder's Batson
challenge, but remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on an unre-
lated issue: whether it would be possible to determine if Snyder had been
competent to stand trial at the time of his conviction. 17
Following the exhaustion of Snyder's claims in the Louisiana courts, 08
he turned to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari, vacated
the judgment, and remanded the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court "for
further consideration in light of Miller-El [II],I °"1 9 which had been decided
just two weeks before. Following the remand, in a four-to-three decision, the
99. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1206.
100. See Snyder, 750 So. 2d at 832. This decision was issued years before Miller-El II was
decided by the Supreme Court.
101. Id. at 839.
102. Id. ("The second step does not require an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausi-
ble, and unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the State's explanation, the reason offered will
be deemed race neutral." (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam))); id. at
841 ("[A]ny response will qualify as race neutral 'unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation.'" (quoting Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991))).
103. Id. at 841.
104. Id. at 846.
105. Id. at 863--64 (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 866 (John-
son, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 864 (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 866-67 (John-
son, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 863.
108. See State v. Snyder, 874 So. 2d 739, 745 (La. 2004).
109. Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005).
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Louisiana Supreme Court once again held that there was no Batson violation
in Snyder."°
Recognizing that Miller-El 11 called for a thorough review of both indi-
vidual challenges and the totality of the circumstances of the trial, the
Louisiana Supreme Court purported to engage in such an analysis on re-
mand."' The court concluded that "[a] review of this record compels a
conclusion that race did not play an impermissible role in the exercise of
these strikes.""2 Two dissenting opinions both found that "the totality of the
evidence" demonstrated that a Batson violation had occurred." 3 One scholar
sharply criticized the majority decision, arguing that "the Snyder [] court
ignored Miller-El H's counsel when it failed to consider the statistical im-
port of the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove every
qualified African-American juror ... and ignored its insistence that a re-
viewing court examine the whole record"" 4 Specifically, this scholar
criticized the court for "dismiss[ing] as irrelevant the prosecutor's pretrial
comments and penalty phase argument comparing this case to O.J. Simp-
son's case by the incredible declaration that those comments lacked racial
content.""' Following the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision, the U.S. Su-
preme Court once again granted certiorari. 16
B. Imposing a New Standard for Reviewing Batson Objections
In a March 2008 opinion written by Justice Alito, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court and, by a seven-to-two vote,
held that a Batson violation had indeed occurred in Snyder."7 This Section
undertakes a detailed analysis of that decision, arguing that the Court cre-
ated a new standard affecting the way in which both trial and appellate
courts must consider possible Batson violations. Although the Court did not
explicitly state that it was creating a new legal standard, Snyder nevertheless
continued the historical trend of the Court moving towards a more individu-
alized analysis in addressing Equal Protection challenges to jury selection
procedures in an effort to create a more enforceable standard.
After reviewing the factual and procedural history of Allen Snyder's
case,"' Justice Alito addressed the Batson standard and the standard of
110. State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484 (La. 2006).
111. See id. at 499.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 500-05 (Kimball, J., dissenting); id. at 505-09 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
114. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Recalcitrance: The Miller-El Remands, 5 OHIo ST. J.
CRIM. L. 131, 151 (2007).
115. Id. at 153.
116. Snyder v. Louisiana, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007) (granting certiorari).
117. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1206(2008).
118. See id. at 1206-07.
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review for Batson claims on appeal.1 '9 The Court stated that "a trial court's
ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is
clearly erroneous.' ' 2 Because of the importance of evaluating the demeanor
of the prosecutor and potential jurors in determining whether an explanation
of a peremptory challenge is pretext for race-based motivations, the Court
recognized that "these determinations of credibility and demeanor lie 'pecu-
liarly within a trial judge's province.' ,,2 Despite this statement of deference
at the beginning of the opinion, however, the Court ultimately applied a very
nondeferential standard of review in Snyder.
The Supreme Court's review was based on Snyder's claim that Batson
violations occurred in relation to two prospective black jurors., 22 Despite
recognizing that Miller-El H called for a review of all of the relevant cir-
cumstances of a trial, however, the Court stated at the beginning of its
discussion of the merits of the case that "the explanation given for the strike
of Mr. Brooks[, one of the prospective jurors in question,] is by itself uncon-
vincing and suffices for the determination that there was Batson error.'
' 23
Understanding the Court's decision in Snyder thus requires understand-
ing the specific nature of the peremptory challenge of Mr. Brooks. After
defense counsel made a Batson objection to the challenge, the prosecutor
offered two reasons in support of the challenge: that Mr. Brooks looked
nervous throughout voir dire, and that he expressed concern over missing
classes he was teaching as a student teacher to finish his college degree.' 24
The trial judge indicated that he would allow the challenge without provid-
ing any indication of whether he was accepting the nervousness
justification, the concern over missing class justification, or both.'25
The Court then examined both justifications offered by the prosecutor.
In a remarkable paragraph that alters the Batson standard, the Court noted
that "the record does not show that the trial judge actually made a determi-
nation concerning Mr. Brooks' demeanor."'' 26 Pointing out that "the trial
judge simply allowed the challenge without explanation," the Court sug-
gested that "the trial judge may not have recalled Mr. Brooks' demeanor.'
27
For these reasons, Justice Alito concluded that "we cannot presume that the
trial judge credited the prosecutor's assertion that Mr. Brooks was nerv-
ous.'' 28 Thus, the Court did not explicitly reject the prosecutor's profferedexplanation that Mr. Brooks appeared nervous, but rather concluded that the
119. Id. at 1207-08.
120. Id. at 1207.
121. Id. at 1208 (quoting Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,428 (1985)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. See id.





trial court did not provide the Court with a sufficient basis for crediting the
prosecutor's explanation.
This conclusion is at odds with the deference paid by the Court earlier in
the opinion to trial judges' unique capability to decide Batson issues." 9 Not-
ing this inconsistency, the Snyder dissent pointed out that the Court had
"never suggested that a reviewing court should defer to a trial court's resolu-
tion of a Batson challenge only if the trial court made specific findings with
respect to each of the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons.' ' 1"
After disposing of the argument concerning Mr. Brooks's demeanor, the
Court addressed the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Brooks was concerned
that jury service would interfere with his student-teaching obligations. After
conducting a thorough review of the circumstances of the strike as called for
by Miller-El H,"' including comparisons to white jurors who also disclosed
conflicts with jury service, the Court concluded that the explanation prof-
fered by the prosecution was pretextual, giving rise to an inference of• 32
discriminatory intent. In rejecting one explanation proffered by the prose-
cutor for the challenge of Mr. Brooks and failing to credit the other, the
Court found a Batson violation and reversed the Louisiana Supreme
Court.
133
By failing to credit a trial court's ruling that a peremptory challenge was
legitimate in the absence of an explanation of the decision by the trial judge,
Snyder thus established a new standard for the review of Batson objec-
tions.M Rather than deferring to trial judges' decisions on Batson
violations,"35 the Snyder Court created a standard that calls for appellate
courts to apply greater scrutiny in reviewing their rulings. Given this in-
creased scrutiny, trial judges who do not wish to risk reversal of their
decisions must provide more complete, on-the-record explanations for their• • 136
rulings on Batson objections. This more detailed focus by trial judges will
likely also force prosecutors to offer more specific arguments in support of
peremptory challenges they make that are subjected to Batson objections.
129. See id. at 1207-08 ("On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent
must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. The trial court has a pvotal role in evaluating Bat-
son claims.") (internal citations omitted).
130. Id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. See Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El I1), 545 U.S. 231,240-52 (2005).
132. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1209-12.
133. Id. at 1212.
134. See id. at 1209; id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 1207-08 (majority opinion).
136. In this regard, an analogy can be made to federal sentencing law. Federal district court
judges are required to provide on-the-record explanations of their sentencing decisions. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c) (2006). The Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe sentencing judge should set forth
enough [of an explanation of his decision] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority."
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). However, these explanations do not necessarily
have to be lengthy. Id. at 356-57.
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The interpretation of this new standard going forward could lead to signifi-
cant changes in the enforcement of Batson.
I1. SNYDER AS AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE BATSON MORE ENFORCEABLE:
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Snyder represents a significant change to the standard of review for Bat-
son objections. However, the history of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
on this issue suggests that the direction in which the Court moved in Snyder
should not be surprising. Snyder is the Court's latest step in a pattern of
cases moving towards a more individualized and enforceable Equal Protec-
tion standard for jury selection. This Part places Snyder in the historical
pattern discussed above'37 and discusses how the new Snyder standard will
impact Batson challenges in the future. Section III.A argues that Snyder fits
within the pattern of cases leading up to and following Batson as an attempt
to apply a more individualized focus to Equal Protection analysis related to
jury selection in order to create a more enforceable standard. Section III.B
analyzes the diverging views of recent cases interpreting Snyder and argues
for a strong interpretation of Snyder as courts address future Batson chal-
lenges.
A. Snyder as a Continuation of the Historical Pattern of
Increasing Scrutiny of Peremptory Challenges
The Supreme Court's decision in Snyder can be understood as the con-
tinuation of its efforts, from Strauder through Miller-El II, to create a
workable standard for applying Equal Protection principles to jury selection.
Snyder recognizes one of the fundamental problems in the Batson line and
attempts to address this problem in a manner consistent with how the Court
has historically addressed similar problems, by applying more individual-
ized scrutiny in an effort to create a more enforceable standard.
The Court's decision in Snyder was reached on the basis of a highly in-
dividualized focus. The Court concluded that "the explanation given for the
strike of Mr. Brooks is by itself unconvincing and suffices for the determina-
tion that there was Batson error."'38 The Court thus based its decision on the
improper peremptory challenge of one venireperson, ignoring the O.J.
Simpson issue, despite acknowledging that Miller-El II "made it clear that in
considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Bat-
son error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial
animosity must be consulted."'3 9
The Court focused narrowly despite the broader analysis of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court and the petitioner's brief to the Court. As ordered by the
137. See supra Section I.B.
138. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1208.
139. Id. (citing Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231,239 (2005)).
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Supreme Court,"'° when considering the case for the second time the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court purported to apply the Miller-El H standard and conduct
its Batson analysis based on the complete circumstances of the case.' 4' In his
brief to the Supreme Court, petitioner Snyder similarly focused on the
broader context of racial discrimination in the case, including an argument
that the O.J. Simpson references made by the prosecutor suggested that ra-
cial bias motivated his peremptory challenges of prospective black jurors,'
4 2
and concluded that "as in Miller-El II, when the 'evidence on the issues
raised is viewed cumulatively, its direction is too powerful to conclude any-
thing but discrimination.' ,,14 The O.J. Simpson issue was discussed fairly
extensively during oral arguments before the Court,'4 with several justices
appearing to give it significant weight. '
4
In declining to address the other issues in play and electing instead to
focus on the peremptory challenge of one potential juror, the Supreme Court
demonstrated that detailed analysis of each peremptory challenge can be an
effective way to address broader Equal Protection problems that apply in the
context of an entire trial. This addresses the problem discussed in Miller-El
H: "[i]f any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson challenge,
then Batson would not amount to much more than Swain."' Snyder took
the type of "meticulous facts and circumstances review"'' 47 called for by
Miller-El II, applied it to the striking of a single venireperson, and raised the
standard for justifying a peremptory challenge. 48 In doing so, the Court
made it more difficult for pretextual explanations of peremptory challenges
to slide by, refusing to accept a reason (Mr. Brooks's alleged nervousness)
that had not been sufficiently explained.
This approach does not render Miller-El Irs analysis of a case's broader
circumstances obsolete. There is nothing in the Snyder opinion that prevents
a court from finding a Batson violation on the basis of the broad circum-
stances of a trial, as in Miller-El H. The Snyder Court cites Miller-El H
favorably, noting that Miller-El H dictates that "all of the circumstances that
bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted" before a court
140. Batson, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005) (granting certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding
for further consideration)..
141. State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 486 (La. 2006).
142. Brief of Petitioner at 40, Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008) (No. 06-10119),
2007 WL 2605447.
143. Id. at 48 (quoting Miller-El H1, 545 U.S. at 265).
144. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, 25-28, 36-43, Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct.
1203 (2008) (No. 06-10119).
145. See, e.g., id. at 36-38 (Justice Souter, mocking the trial judge's disregard for this issue,
noting that "we have to consider the O.J. Simpson remark in trying to evaluate what went on," and
stating that he finds it "highly unlikely" that the O.J. Simpson comment would have been made had
the defendant been white).
146. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El 11), 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005); see also Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
147. Davenport, supra note 73, at 979.
148. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208-12 (2008).
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can dismiss a Batson claim. 49 The Snyder Court simply determined that
since the peremptory challenge of one juror constituted Batson error, no
further analysis was required. ° Snyder adds to the Miller-El II mode of
analysis by allowing for greater scrutiny of individual peremptory chal-
lenges and the reasons proffered in support of these challenges.
The highly individualized focus in Snyder fits squarely into the histori-
cal pattern of the Supreme Court continually applying greater scrutiny in its
Equal Protection analysis related to jury selection in an effort to create a
more enforceable standard. Snyder addresses the problem that "[a]ny prose-
cutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror"'' by
applying a more probing analysis of any potentially pretextual explanation
for a peremptory challenge. While not eliminating the danger that pretextual
explanations for racially motivated peremptory challenges will be accepted
by a court, Snyder, in a manner consistent with the historical arc of the Bat-
son line, addresses one of the fundamental problems of the Equal Protection
Clause as applied to jury selection and creates a standard that allows courts
to better enforce it.
Snyder also fits into the historical pattern of how the Court has changed
the way it addresses the tension between Equal Protection and peremptory
challenges. In 1965 the Swain Court declined to submit prosecutors' per-
emptory challenges to an individualized review under the Equal Protection
Clause.'52 However, over time the Court moved towards the viewpoint ex-
pressed by Justice Goldberg's dissent in Swain, holding that the Constitution
compels that the Equal Protection Clause trumps the sanctity of the tradi-
tional operation of the peremptory challenge when they come into
conflict.'53 The Court has thus moved away from the traditional idea that the
peremptory challenge is a purely discretionary device.'5 Snyder continues
this trend by increasing the level of explanation required to support a chal-
lenge. Despite the suggestions of Justice Marshall, 5 Justice Breyer, 56 and•• 157
other critics, the peremptory challenge has not been eliminated from our
legal system. It has, however, developed to a point where the challenge is
actually far from peremptory in nature.
149. Id. at 1208.
150. Id.
151. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
152. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1965).
153. See Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 239-40 (2005); Batson, 476 U.S. at
89; Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
154. See Garguilo, supra note 69, at 791; Alexis Straus, Note, (Not) Mourning the Demise of
the Peremptory Challenge: Twenty Years ofBatson v. Kentucky, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv.
309, 337-39 (2007).
155. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
156. See Miller-El I1, 545 U.S. at 273 (Breyer, J., concurring).
157. See, e.g., Garguilo, supra note 69, at 795-96; Straus, supra note 154, at 338-39.
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B. The Impact of the Snyder Standard Going Forward
Snyder v. Louisiana continues the Supreme Court's trend towards more
focused, individualized review in an effort to create an enforceable Equal
Protection standard for jury selection. As discussed above,'-" Snyder creates
a new standard for reviewing Batson objections by refusing to accept a
prosecutor's proffered justification for a peremptory challenge absent some
explanation of the decision by the trial judge.'59 The question that remains is
how exactly this new standard will be implemented.
Several commentators have argued that Snyder will not effectively increase
the scrutiny to which pretextual peremptory challenges are subjected. They ar-
gue that the Snyder opinion "all but instruct[s] trial judges on how to usurp
Batson" by instructing them that if they wish to receive deference to their rul-
ings they need simply explain that they are crediting a demeanor explanation
proffered by the prosecution.'6 One scholar also criticizes the Court for not
squarely addressing the overall context of racism present in the Snyder prosecu-
tion, as indicated by the O.J. Simpson references. These commentators
suggest that it may be time to abolish the peremptory challenge altogether.'62
It is true that Snyder is not a cure-all for addressing the danger of pretex-
tual explanations for peremptory challenges. However, it is clearly a step in
the right direction. It has always been the case that trial judges are given
deference under the Batson standard. Batson itself noted that "[wie have
confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be
able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of per-
emptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against
black jurors."' 63 Criticizing Snyder on the grounds that it provides trial
judges with a roadmap for circumventing Batson misses the point. Snyder
did not create the standard in which trial judges' determinations as to de-
meanor are given deference on appeal; it simply reaffirmed this fundamental
reality under Batson.'" By requiring an explanation, Snyder forces trial
judges to consider whether there is some basis for an explanation proffered
by a prosecutor, and thus might force prosecutors to further consider the
158. See supra Section U.B.
159. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1209 (2008).
160. Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting Trilogy, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1722 (2008); accord The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 276, 355 (2008) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
161. Nelson, supra note 160, at 1718-19.
162. Id. at 1723-24; Leading Cases, supra note 160, at 353. Despite a number of opportuni-
ties, the Court has declined to take this route. See Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El 11), 545 U.S. 231,
266-73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106-08 (1986) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
163. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall also recognized the
central role trial judges would play, but did not share the majority's faith in the ability of these
judges to detect discrimination. Justice Marshall argued that "[any prosecutor can easily assert
facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those
reasons." Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
164. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1207-08.
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basis for their explanations of peremptory challenges. Furthermore, al-
though Snyder reaffirms the general principle of deference to trial judges on
demeanor-based decisions, requiring an on-the-record explanation by trial
judges at least creates the potential for appellate review of these decisions if
"exceptional circumstances" exist. 65
It is indeed surprising that the Snyder decision does not discuss the
broader racial overtones of the case. However, by focusing narrowly, Snyder
increased the level of scrutiny to which prosecutors' peremptory challenges
are to be subjected.' 66 The Snyder Court could have considered all of the
circumstances of the case and reversed under Miller-El II, but doing so
would not have changed the Batson standard. While the Snyder Court was
unwilling to eliminate the peremptory challenge, it did continue the trend of
moving away from the truly peremptory character of the challenge. 1
67
Snyder increases the intensity with which courts must scrutinize poten-
tially pretextual explanations of peremptory challenges. The Snyder opinion
does not, however, clearly indicate under what circumstances its standard of
review should be applied. It is possible that Snyder means that trial judges
must explain the basis for their decisions on every Batson objection. It is
also possible that such an explanation .is only required if the reason prof-
fered by the prosecutor in support of a peremptory challenge is not
supported elsewhere in the record. Finally, it is possible that the standard
only applies under identical circumstances to Snyder, where one of the pros-
ecutor's explanations for a peremptory challenge is not accepted absent an
explanation by the trial judge if another proffered explanation is found to be
pretext for racially-motivated challenges.
Decisions in lower federal courts since Snyder have already begun to
demonstrate the effect Snyder will have on the review of Batson objections.
Although there have not been many authoritative courts of appeals decisions
discussing how the Snyder standard will change Batson challenges going
forward, several cases begin to provide a sense of the divergent interpreta-
tions of how Snyder should be applied.' 6 The Seventh Circuit has modeled a
broad application of Snyder, while the Fifth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and
Eleventh Circuit have interpreted Snyder more narrowly.
A recent Seventh Circuit case illustrates what a broad application of
Snyder might look like. In United States v. McMath, the prosecution chal-
lenged a venireperson on the sole grounds that he had an unhappy
expression on his face, and the trial judge denied the defendant's subsequent
Batson objection without explanation.' 69 This demeanor explanation was the
165. See id.
166. See supra Section li.A.
167. See supra Section I1I.A.
168. See, e.g., Braxton v. Gansheimer, 561 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. McMath,
559 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2009); Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States
v. Prather, 279 F. App'x 761 (11 th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Reed, 277 F. App'x 357
(5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
169. 559 F.3d 657, 666 (7th Cir. 2009).
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only justification for the challenge that was offered.170 The Seventh Circuit
rejected the lack of explanation by the trial court, stating that "Snyder makes
clear that a summary denial does not allow us to assume that the prosecu-
tion's reason was credible" and concluding that "the district court clearly
erred in denying the Batson challenge without making findings regarding
the credibility of the proffered race-neutral justification for the strike.''7
McMath provides a demonstration of a strong application of Snyder, clearly
requiring a judge to provide an explanation for a ruling on a prosecutor's
justification for a challenge in a situation in which there was no second, pre-
textual reason offered by the prosecutor as in Snyder.1
2
Several other circuits have interpreted Snyder more narrowly. In Smulls
v. Roper, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of appellant's habeas corpus
petition, based partly on a Batson claim. ' Although the court rejected the
claim for procedural reasons, 74 it nevertheless undertook a substantive
analysis of appellant's Batson claims, applying Snyder. Appellant argued
that the trial court violated Snyder by not making any findings concerning
the reasons proffered by the prosecutor in support of various peremptory
challenges. In rejecting appellant's claim, the Smulls court applied Snyder
narrowly, suggesting that an explanation is required only if another justifica-• . 176
tion offered by the prosecutor has been found invalid.
The Smulls dissent applied a much stronger reading of Snyder. The dis-
sent argued that "Snyder teaches that an appellate court cannot presume a
trial court correctly analyzed a Batson challenge when it is impossible to
divine the court's reasoning."'17 This opinion suggests that Snyder prevents
an appellate court from affirming a trial court's Batson decision absent some
explanation indicating that "the trial court found the proffered reasons had a
basis in fact"' 171 or if the reason can otherwise be confirmed in the record.
17 9
170. Id. at 661.
171. Id. at 666.
172. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Thaler v. Haynes does not foreclose such a broad
application of Snyder. The Haynes Court merely rejected a categorical rule that "a demeanor-based
explanation for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and
recalls the relevant aspects of the prospective juror's demeanor." Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. -_, 5
(2010). The Court left open the possibility that Snyder "alter[ed] or add[ed] to Batson's rule" Id. at
5 n.2.
173. Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 855-57 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
174. The Smulls court held that because Snyder was not clearly established law at the time the
state court's rejected appellant's Batson claim, it could not serve as the basis for habeas corpus
relief. Id. at 861.
175. Id. at 860.
176. Id. at 860-61.
177. Id. at 872 (Bye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
178. Id.
179. The Smulls dissent argues that "had the Court been able to confirm the juror in Snyder
appeared nervous, the trial court's denial of the challenge would likely have been affirmed." Id.
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180An Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Prather, also applied a nar-
row interpretation of Snyder. The appellant argued that, following a Batson
objection, the district court violated Snyder by accepting the prosecutor's
justifications for peremptory challenges without explanation.' The Elev-
enth Circuit did not accept this argument, stating that the Snyder Court did
not reverse the trial court "because [it] failed to explain itself clearly, but
because it was unclear whether the [trial] court's finding rested on a plausi-
ble or implausible explanation."'' 2 Like the majority in Smulls, this suggests
a limited reading of Snyder, indicating that it only applies in similar factual
circumstances where one proffered reason was found invalid and the trial
judge did not explain the remaining reason.
The court in United States v. Reed also took a narrower view of Sny-
der.' The appellant in Reed argued that the trial court violated Snyder by
not providing explanations for why it accepted peremptory challenges made
by the prosecutor.'8" The court rejected this argument, stating that "neither of
the government's proffered reasons centered on a juror's demeanor or ap-
peared implausible in comparison with accepted jurors' responses."' 85 This
statement suggests a very narrow interpretation of Snyder, where it would
only apply to situations nearly identical to Snyder, in which a prosecutor
offered two arguments in support of a challenge, one was found invalid, and
the other focused on demeanor and was not explained by the trial court.
The majority of federal appellate opinions handed down since Snyder,
such as Smulls, Prather, and Reed, 86 have limited the application of Snyder
to narrow circumstances. The ultimate determination of how Snyder will be
interpreted remains to be seen, however, as a split appears to be emerging on
the interpretation of Snyder and, to date, discussion of the issues in pub-
lished opinions has been relatively brief.
The history leading up to Snyder and the Snyder decision itself suggest
that a proper reading of the case would more closely resemble McMath or
the Smulls dissent. The Snyder Court held that absent an explanation, it
could not assume that the trial judge credited the justification for the chal-
lenge proffered by the prosecutor.' The Court did not hold that this failure
to credit the prosecutor's nervousness justification for the challenge of Mr.
Brooks was dependent on the student-teaching justification, which the Court
180. 279 F App'x 761 (1 lth Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
181. Id. at 767.
182. Id.
183. 277 F. App'x 357 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
184. Id. at 364 n.6.
185. Id.
186. See also Braxton v. Gansheimer, 561 F.3d 453, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that "[a]
determinative factor in the [Snyder] Court's holding was its conclusion that the prosecution's second
reason proffered for the strike-the juror's student-teaching obligations-was... 'pretextual"').
187. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1209 (2008) ("[Where] the trial judge simply al-
lowed the challenge without explanation ... we cannot presume that the trial judge credited the
prosecution's assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous.").
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rejected.18s Instead, the Court noted that since "the trial judge simply al-
lowed the challenge without explanation," it was possible that "the trial
judge may not have recalled Mr. Brooks' demeanor" or that "the trial judge
may have found it unnecessary to consider Mr. Brooks' demeanor, instead
basing his ruling completely on the second proffered justification for the
strike."' 9 The Court concluded that for all of these reasons it could not
credit the nervousness explanation proffered by the prosecutor.' 90 The failure
to credit the nervousness explanation was thus not based on the fact that the
second explanation offered by the prosecutor was found to be pretextual, but
the uncertainty as to how the trial judge viewed the nervousness explana-
tion, caused by the fact that he provided no explanation for overruling the
Batson objection.' 9'
This conclusion is further supported by the structure of the Snyder ma-
jority opinion. The Court fails to credit the nervousness explanation in part
III.A of its opinion. 192 It does not address the student-teaching explanation
until part III.B of the opinion. 93 The Court thus reaches its conclusion that it
cannot credit the prosecutor's nervousness explanation before reaching the
student-teaching explanation, indicating that its conclusions in the two sec-
tions are independent.
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Snyder appears to share this un-
derstanding of the meaning of the Snyder majority. Justice Thomas argues
that "we have never suggested that a reviewing court should defer to a trial
court's resolution of a Batson challenge only if the trial court made specific
findings with respect to each of the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral rea-
sons."' 94 Justice Thomas's statement suggests that his interpretation of the
Snyder majority is that it broadly requires trial judges to provide explana-
tions.
Courts interpreting Snyder going forward would not need to always re-
quire trial judges to explain their Batson rulings in order to effectuate the
purpose of the Snyder standard. Courts could adopt a standard similar to that
suggested by the Smulls dissent in which appellate courts will not credit a
prosecutor's justification for a peremptory challenge unless the trial judge
explains his basis for accepting the challenge or the reason offered by the
prosecutor is otherwise supported in the record. 19' By not accepting a reason
without some sort of on-the-record support, this application of Snyder
would still encourage trial judges to create a more thorough record for
188. See id. at 1212.
189. Id. at 1209.
190. Id.
191. The Snyder Court declined to address the issue of which of the two reasons offered was
the actual cause of the prosecutor challenging Mr. Brooks. See id. at 1212.
192. Id. at 1209.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. See Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 872 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Bye, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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appellate review, and in doing so would cause trial judges to take a closer
look at potentially pretextual justifications offered by prosecutors in support
of peremptory challenges. This would allow Snyder to serve as a tool for a
more focused Equal Protection analysis in seeking to root out racial dis-
crimination in jury selection.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has grappled with the problem of how to effectively
enforce the Equal Protection Clause in the jury selection context for many
years. Over time, a pattern has emerged in which the Court has applied a
continuously more focused approach to this problem, moving from striking
down statutory provisions that forbid African Americans from serving as
jurors196 to detailed analyses of peremptory challenges made against individ-
ual venirepersons, to determine whether an Equal Protection violation
occurred."' Snyder v. Louisiana is the latest step in this progression, requir-
ing trial judges to explain the basis for their rulings on Batson challenges.
This rule helps smoke out whether facially race-neutral reasons proffered by
prosecutors are a pretext for racially motivated challenges. Although it is not
yet clear how the Snyder standard will be applied going forward, a proper
application of Snyder would require upholding a defendant's Batson chal-
lenge absent some explanation by the trial judge of his reason for accepting
a prosecutor's justification of a peremptory challenge or at least other proof
on the record that the justification proffered by the prosecutor was legiti-
mate.
196. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
197. See Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
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